Temporäre Migration - Ein Weg für Europa?

  • Temporary migration – a path for Europe?

Schaefer, Karen Antonia; Lorz, Oliver (Thesis advisor)

Aachen : Publikationsserver der RWTH Aachen University (2011)
Dissertation / PhD Thesis

Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2010

Abstract

Immigration is on top of the European political agenda. Illegal immigration at the European boarders is a central issue. The European approach to deal with this problem so far was to close the boarders and to enhance controls. These measures did not lead to a decline of the quantity of illegal immigrants, but to a shift of routes. In recent years, European politicians recognized that determent does not change the immigration situation in Southern Europe. Hence, new approaches towards legal immigration such as temporary and selective immigration are discussed. These concepts are the basis for the following analysis. This thesis identifies a way to deal with illegal Immigration by applying temporary and selective immigration. On the basis of existing immigration theories we develop an economic model to demonstrate the functionality of temporary migration. The incentives of the migrants are essential for the parameters of the model. The incentive to leave right on time to the home country is supported by a monetary incentive. In the model legal migration is possible on a fixed-term visa, while it is not possible to migrate without this visa. In the initial situation there is only illegal immigration. The model explains the constraints for a working concept of temporary immigration. We find that the capital market conditions for immigrants are crucial. The results show that the implementation of temporary immigration is feasible if the return of the migrants is supported financially. There is a simultaneous discourse on the European level about controlling illegal migration and the implementation of temporary immigration as well as about desirable migration of qualified migrants. This work analyses both aspects in one model. To do so we combine the model of temporary migration with a selection approach. This approach generates a selection of qualified and unqualified migrants after a probation period. The selection instruments are a tax on working income and a monetary bond for leaving the country. The migrants differ in their working productivity. The analysis of both political targets of the EU, reducing illegal migration through temporary migration and increasing the immigration of qualified migrants, leads to an efficient solution for both objectives. Asymmetric information about the working productivity can be reduced through monitoring during probation period and monetary incentives. Permanent immigration of qualified migrants is feasible via the right choice of incentive instruments. The firms can employ the desired quantity of migrants for an unrestricted time and the other migrants have the incentive to go home due to the monetary bond for leaving. The work´s aim is to determine a concept to solve the situation of illegal migration; the introduced approaches can be designed to reduce risks and costs for migrants and the destination countries. Legal migration can be an instrument to combat refugee disasters. In combination with a selective approach it is possible to reduce the shortage of skilled workers in certain sectors. The conclusion for the EU is to examine these two migration issues together to find a combined solution and concept.

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